Ordination Standards and Essential Tenets

by Arnold Rots

[6-16-04]

The Issue

The Book of Order requires governing bodies to examine the deacons, elders, and ministers of word and sacrament that they ordain and install. The guidance that we are given is that the candidates affirm the essential tenets of the Reformed faith but are permitted to state their "scruples" on elements of doctrine that are deemed not essential.

This simple formulation has profound consequences. It means that we cannot apply the common examination criteria of grading the candidate on a set list of questions, add up the score, and declare pass or fail. Instead, the criteria for every candidate need to be established on the merits of the case at hand. It is really up to the judgment of the presbytery or the session - and the essence of Presbyterianism is that we trust those judgments.

It all started in 1729 with the Adopting Act that established the first Presbyterian church in North America. The question was whether candidates for office should be required to subscribe to a specific set of articles of faith, as advocated by the Scottish Presbyterians. It was decided otherwise, acknowledging that people's faith cannot be regimented, that faith may be expressed in a variety of ways - to the enrichment of our understanding -, and that our understanding may change. The clear problem with having candidates subscribe to particular articles of faith is that it is not a matter of pledging allegiance to scripture, but to a particular interpretation of scripture. As such, it does not leave any space either for the Spirit to work on our understanding of scripture.

Yet, at several instances since 1729 people have felt uneasy about the fact that there is no definition of what exactly those essential tenets are and there have been attempts to specify them.

Although the desire is understandable, it defeats the purpose: if we enumerate the essential tenets and ask candidates to affirm them, we are back to strict subscription which is something that our predecessors attempted to avoid.

We have managed to live with the formula as it stands for almost 300 years and it has served the church well. Nevertheless, there are once again voices asking for a definition of the essential tenets. In such situations it is helpful to look back and see what happened on similar occasions in the past.

General Assembly Positions

Historically, General Assemblies have taken the positions:

· that, although the General Assembly has the authority to make doctrinal declaratory deliverances, such statements can and should not be applied in general and can and should not elevate any articles of doctrine to the status of essential and necessary, except under certain narrow conditions;

· that the General Assemblies be urged to exercise extreme caution in these matters, recognizing that "principle that the Presbytery's right to determine the fitness of a candidate is paramount" [Minutes of the General Assembly 1927, p.79];

· and that great tolerance and mutual forbearance be recommended to the members of the church.

Previous General Assemblies have firmly rejected the principle of strict subscription while specifically allowing the stipulation of scruples. It behooves us to recognize the wisdom displayed by the actions of these General Assemblies and, desiring to continue in the rich Reformed tradition, to firmly decline declaring any articles of doctrine essential and necessary, cognizant that such declaratory deliverances are futile as vehicles to control ordination requirements and dangerous to the peace, purity and unity of the church, where "there are truths and forms, with respect to which men [and women] of good character and principles may differ" [Minutes of the General Assembly 1926, p.80].

The Commission of 1925

As mentioned above, the specific issue of a General Assembly making a declaratory deliverance concerning essential and necessary articles of faith has been considered in the past and it was concluded that the Assembly is well advised to act cautiously and, if possible, refrain from such statements. The Commission of 1925 ("Swearingen Commission") has argued the case for this position far more effectively than we could ever hope to do. For one thing, there is the question of credibility: I will readily concede that this commission of solid, predominantly moderate Presbyterians carries more weight with most people than the opinion of a flaming liberal like myself.

This Commission was constituted specifically to address the problems that were caused by previous General Assemblies (1910, 1916, and 1923) defining five doctrinal statements as essential and necessary: biblical inerrancy, virgin birth, substitutionary atonement, physical resurrection, and miracles. The issue was whether requiring affirmation of these essential tenets amounted to strict subscription - to a particular interpretation of scripture. The bottom line of the Commission's reports was that these five points are not essential tenets and that Presbyterians of good character and principles may reasonably disagree on them.

Its first report, to the General Assembly of 1926, presented a survey of the prevailing opinions and delivered an eloquent defense of tolerance and forbearance. The second report, to the General Assembly of 1927, scrupulously considered the matter of authority concerning essential and necessary articles of faith.

The Reports of the Commission of 1925

Standing in the historical Presbyterian tradition we will let excerpts from these reports, both approved overwhelmingly by their respectively General Assemblies, speak for themselves. It is instructive and refreshing to see how this - mainly moderate - commission approached the subject. The page numbers refer to the Minutes of the General Assemblies of 1926 and 1927.

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1926, p.79,80

Toleration as a principle applicable within the Presbyterian Church refers to an attitude and a practice according to which the status of a minister or other ordained officer, is acknowledged and fellowship is extended to him [or her], even though he [or she] may hold some views that are individual on points not regarded as essential to the system of faith which the Church professes. Presbyterianism is a great body of belief, but it is more than a belief; it is also a tradition, a controlling sentiment. The ties which bind us to it are not of the mind only; they are ties of the heart as well. There are people who, despite variant opinions, can never be at home in any other communion. They were born into the Presbyterian Church. They love its name, its order and its great distinctive teachings. In its fellowship they have a precious inheritance from their forbears. Their hearts bow at its altars and cherish a just pride in its noble history. Attitudes and sentiments like these are treasures which should not be undervalued hastily nor cast aside lightly. A sound policy of constitutional tolerance is designed to conserve such assets whenever it is possible to do so without endangering the basic positions of the Church.

The liberty which toleration allows is not to be judged finally by individuals. It is freedom with boundaries, and these boundaries are fixed by constitutional authority. Perhaps we are prone to forget that toleration begins with the mass. It is the self-imposed restraint which an organized body lays upon its own action. Either by a written constitution or by prevailing practice an organization draws lines beyond which it pledges itself not to pass. It delimits areas which it will not invade, and within these areas the individual member of the organization has freedom. The entire body exercises its own liberty first, in voluntarily circumscribing the field of its action, and this, in turn, guarantees the liberty of the individual outside of such limits.

It follows, therefore, that whenever a question arises as to where these limits are, the issue must be decided by the organization and not by the individual member of it. As applied within the Presbyterian Church, this means that such issues will be determined either generally, by amendment of the Constitution, or particularly, by Presbyterial authority, subject to the constitutional right of appeal.

[…]

The principle here set forth can not be better stated than is done in the Form of Government, Chap. I, Section V:

"That while under the conviction of the above principle, they think it necessary to make effectual provision, that all who are admitted as teachers, be sound in the faith; they also believe that there are truths and forms, with respect to which men [and women] of good character and principles may differ. And in all these they think it the duty both of private Christians and societies, to exercise mutual forbearance towards each other."

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1926, p.86

It is Recommended -

[…]

3. That the General Assembly, while welcoming the discussion of great theological and practical issues[,] lays upon the consciences of ministers and members, the duty of exercising patience and forbearance, and of refraining from public expression of hasty or harsh judgments of the motives of brethren [and sisters] whose hearts are fully known only to God; especially from bringing against individuals "in a calumniating manner," and not in the legally prescribed way, charges which assail their loyalty as Presbyterian ministers or ruling elders, and even their Christian belief, and which otherwise tend to weaken their influence as servants of Christ in His Church; so that discussion of the serious problems affecting the welfare of our Church, in so far as discussion may seem wise or necessary, may proceed in a way that will persuade the minds and win the hearts of men [and women], stimulate the Church to greater activity in carrying forward its task and encourage all to provoke one another to love and good works.

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1927, p.78, 79

The specific question is, What authority, if any, does the General Assembly possess for declaring any article to be an essential and necessary one in a sense which renders its statement mandatory and applicable to all cases.

One fact often overlooked is that by the Act of 1729, the decision as to essential and necessary articles was to be in specific cases. It was no general authority that might be stated in exact language and applied rigidly to every case without distinction. It was an authority somewhat undefined, to be invoked in each particular instance.

[…]

[T]here is nothing in the Act of 1729 definitely and certainly inconsistent with the principle that the Presbytery's right to determine the fitness of a candidate is paramount.

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1927, p.80ff

To declare an article of faith "essential and necessary" to this system [of doctrine] is a serious undertaking. Undoubtedly there are articles, which all will agree fall within this classification, but there are others about which there will be differences of opinion. A doctrine may be entirely true and yet not to be an "essential and necessary article" in this system. The question is not as to its truth, primarily, but, rather, is it essential to the system? And the minds of individuals, certainly the mind of the Church itself, should be deeply humble and devoutly prayerful when attempting to decide an issue of such grave import as this.

A Solemn Responsibility

In regard to determination of the question as to which are "essential and necessary articles," within the meaning just defined, the General Assembly has an undoubted right to interpret the Constitution in declaratory deliverances and all must recognize the duty of the Assembly from time to time to bear general witness, as there may be need, to the corporate faith of the Church. Perhaps most persons will concede that it would be a very solemn responsibility which the General Assembly would exercise in designating, even in a declaratory deliverance, any doctrine as an essential and necessary article. An Assembly is not bound in this respect by the actions of former Assemblies, and, therefore, any statement of the sort which it makes may possibly be altered or canceled by later deliverances. Such deliverances might be made under the prevalence of a spirit and under the influence of other conditions not the most favorable. Assuming that the right exists to follow such procedure, the exercise of the right may lead, as experience has shown, to disturbing results.

It is probable that, after there has been opportunity for reflection, and when minds are not affected by the exigencies of controversy, most of the ministers and members of our Church will agree that the risk of such action is great, and that the General Assembly may well refrain from taking such a course, especially as it may be misconstrued as a virtual amending of our organic law by another method than that prescribed by the Constitution.

Limits of a Mandatory Judicial Decision

The General Assembly, when acting in its judicial capacity, has a right to decide questions of this kind only as they apply to a specific case under consideration and as the decision may be affected by all the circumstances of that case. Should the doctrinal beliefs of a candidate be challenged in a judicial action as not being of a character to qualify him [or her] under our Constitution for preaching the gospel, it is competent for the General Assembly to decide that, in view of all the conditions surrounding this particular case, the opinions which the candidate holds are not such as fit him [or her] for the office of the ministry in the Presbyterian Church; but this is quite different from deciding, as a general proposition, that certain articles, when considered abstractly and logically, are essential and necessary to the system of doctrine contained in the Holy Scriptures.

It follows from the above that the decision of a particular case involving this issue, when rendered by the General Assembly acting in its judicial capacity, cannot be made to rest properly upon a merely declaratory deliverance of a former Assembly. A judicial decision is grounded in the Constitution itself and derives its chief additional support from similar decisions arrived at in the same manner and resting upon the same foundation.

It seems quite clear, furthermore, that, granting for the moment the authority of the General Assembly, acting in any capacity, to declare broadly that an article is essential and necessary, it would be required to quote the exact language of the article as it appears in the Confession of Faith. It could not paraphrase the language nor use other terms than those employed within the Constitution, much less could it erect into essential and necessary articles doctrines which are only derived as inferences from the statements of the Confession.