Sudan Atrocities
As early as 1994 the
Presbyterian General Assembly was calling
for attention to the crisis in Sudan and for cooperative
international action.
[10-27-04]
The Sudan crisis continues, and the Presbyterian
Washington Office provides a careful and detailed account of what's
happening, and what's not. Very briefly: The U.S., in spite of calling the
situation in Darfur a case of genocide, has done little. The UN has passed
only a weak resolution. Only the newly established 53-nation African Union
(AU) has been strongly engaged - helping to work out and monitor a ceasefire
agreement which they are still struggling to bring to realization.
What's to be done? Jennifer Davis of the Washington Office
on Africa says humanitarian aid is essential; international sanctions are
needed, so the Sudanese government will feel more pain than gain from its
oppressive actions; and the African Union peacekeeping force needs to be
supported.
Rousing the International Community
October 20: News from Sudan has not improved since our May
report, despite the spotlight of international attention. Darfur even made
it into the first U.S. presidential debate in September, though neither
candidate displayed real concern about long-term U.S.-Africa policy and its
impact on continuing conflict and poverty on the continent.
There is growing acknowledgement that the Government of
Sudan is waging a deliberate campaign of death, dispossession and
destruction against the people of Darfur, mostly against the non-Arab Fur,
Zaghawa and Masaalit groups. This is in retaliation for the armed
"rebellion" launched in October 2003 by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA)
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to demand an end to the
exclusion from all economic and political power of the large African (mainly
Muslim) farming population of Darfur. These people had historically lived in
the region in relative peace along with nomadic, pastoral "Arabized" cattle
herders, although there have long been tensions over access to land and
water, which increasing desertification has worsened.
The current crisis in Darfur, analysts say, is a
continuation of a 15-year effort by Khartoum to put down potential political
challenges and get rid of rebels demanding greater regional autonomy and
power sharing. The political and economic agenda of the SLA and JEM includes
an increased share in Sudan government spending for schools, hospitals and
regional development, along with expanded self-government and a possible
federal system of governance.
The government response to the latest threat to its
exclusive control was swift and brutal, invoking scorched earth attacks on
villages and populations by a combination of official government forces and
armed militia, known as the Janjawiid. In December 2003 U.N. Emergency
Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland told the world that Darfur "has quickly
become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world." At least 1.7
million people, out of around 6.5 million in the Darfur region, are now
internally displaced, and more than 230,000 have fled across the border into
Chad.[Note 1] In September the World Health
Organization (WHO) reported that as many as 10,000 Darfuris are dying each
month in the ill-equipped camps into which they fled from the Janjawiid and
Sudan government military attacks.2
The government denies responsibility for militia actions,
but on-the-ground evidence provides a very different reality. Humanitarian
workers and reporters able to reach the displaced and the refugees continue
to hear descriptions of events which reveal close links between the various
forces involved in the onslaught. "First the airplanes came to bomb the
village and then the Janjawiid followed, on horse and foot, burning, looting
and raping" is a widely heard description of events witnessed by the
refugees.
In July 2004, Human Rights Watch released four documents
which exposed official support of militia activities as a matter of Khartoum
policy. After a visit to Darfur this September, Sen. Jon Corzine and former
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke concluded:"The goal of the
central government in supporting and encouraging the Janjaweed seems clear;
to 'depopulate'- that is, destroy-the villages and create as many refugees
as possible in order to eliminate the village structure of Darfur, which is
a base for the activity of (the) two rebel movements..."3
Tunnel Vision Impedes Peace
Effective international action to end the violence, now
frequently described as genocide, has still not followed the growing
awareness of the Darfur crisis. In addition, Sudan church leaders have
expressed major concern that the international community appears willing
only to focus on the most publicised African case of the moment, so that the
broader issues of war and peace for all Sudanese are being ignored.
An August meeting of the Sudan Council of Churches warned
its international partners about recent delays in the Naivasha peace
process, which has entailed more than two years of effort-with international
participation-to negotiate a permanent and just end to the 21-year
north-south civil war between the Sudan People 's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
and the Khartoum government, in which an estimated two million people have
been killed.4
Talks on security issues established a model allowing two
armies during an interim period, with some joint units, but did not resolve
many issues, like power sharing, wealth sharing-especially oil revenues-and
the status of marginal areas. Negotiations ground to a halt, probably
because Sudan hoped that distracted international attention would allow it
to derail the Navaisha process.
In August, the Southern African Catholic Bishops'
Conference pointed out that the violent pattern of divide and rule in Darfur
was not a new one for Sudan, and that "thousands in other parts of Sudan,
such as the Malakal district, silently face equally devastating violence at
the hands of militias actively supported by the Khartoum government." The
peace talks were to begin again on October 7, and Yasir Arman, spokesman for
the SPLA warned: "The alternative to a comprehensive peace settlement is
comprehensive war....We prefer to finalise the peace agreement...We are
hopeful that this time the government (Khartoum) will have the political
will to finalise the deal."
Such concerns underscore the importance of the
international community maintaining pressure on the Khartoum government in
an overall effort to achieve peace, participation and justice for all the
people of Sudan. A permanent peace will need to invoke national
reconciliation, ending the marginalization of huge sectors of the country
and population and the narrow domination of power by Khartoum.
Saying "Genocide" Is Not Enough
In April 2004 worldwide ceremonies marked the 10th
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide - in which at least 800,000 people were
murdered. World leaders and statesmen made speeches pledging "never again,"
but that month U.N. Emergency Relief Co-ordinator Egeland briefed the U.N.
Security Council on the coordinated "scorched-earth" campaign of ethnic
cleansing by Janjawiid militia - and the Security Council took no action.
In the U.S., a growing grassroots movement began
mobilizing to make "never again" a reality. Many diverse voices urged the
U.S. government to call the Darfur crisis genocide. The demand was made at
Washington demonstrations organized by a broad spectrum of U.S. faith-based,
humanitarian, civic and human rights organizations. It was central to an
Africa Action petition with 28,800 signatures delivered to Secretary of
State Powell, and it was highlighted across the country in local activities
organized by a growing network which included students, many Africa
activists and scholars.
As a last act before the 2004 summer recess, both the
Senate and the House unanimously passed a resolution naming the situation
genocide, and called for a U.S.-led multilateral, or unilateral,
intervention to stop the genocide, should the U.N. Security Council fail to
act.5
But the international attention did not bring consensus on
how to provide security. Continuing atrocities were widely described, but
the political will to halt them seemed entangled in complex debate about
whether the Sudanese military and the state-sponsored Janjawiid were
responsible for crimes against human- ity, or war crimes, "ethnic
cleansing," or genocide. Secretary General Kofi Annan and Colin Powell took
a message of concern to Khartoum in June, holding discussions with the
government, visiting Darfur camps for displaced people and refugee camps in
Chad. Both leaders avoided describing the situation as genocide, though
activists believed this designation would allow authorization of
international action to prevent and punish the atrocities under the 1948
"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" to
which 130 countries are signatories, including the U.S.
It took the U.S. government another two months to make the
declaration of genocide, after U.S. investigators had recorded testimonies
from 1,136 refugees and displaced people who had fled Darfur. On September
9th Secretary of State Powell testified to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that: "We concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and
that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and
genocide may still be occurring."
Powell made it disturbingly clear that the genocide
finding would bring no swift U.S. action, while acknowledging that "some
seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to take action.
In fact, how- ever, no new action is dictated by this determination. We have
been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government to act
responsibly."
African Union Action
A notable exception to international foot-dragging on
action against the violence has come from the newly established 53-nation
African Union (AU). It helped broker a ceasefire agreement early in 2004
involving all parties, signed in N'Djamena April 8. This laid the basis for
the deployment of international monitors and a protection force under the
AU, to which Sudan agreed.
Within six weeks the AU had deployed the first observers,
who urgently reported on Khartoum- sponsored violations. By September 13th
Sam Ibok (director of the AU 's Peace and Security Council) reported 185
observers operating, with a 310- strong force of Rwandan and Nigerian
soldiers assigned to provide protection for the monitors. Logistical
problems delayed full deployment, and the force was too small to provide
security to millions of civilians at risk, but Rwandan President Kagame
declared that his troops would not repeat the U.N. experience in Rwanda -
standing by and watching violence perpetrated against civilians because of a
limited "mandate." The vast and difficult terrain involved in the conflict
(the size of France or Texas) soon led the AU to see the need to mount a
much larger peacekeeping force (perhaps 2,000-5,000 soldiers) mandated to
protect civilian lives, but Khartoum continued to reject this force and the
AU would not act in defiance of the Sudan government.
The AU also continued mediating talks between the SLA, the
JEM and Khartoum, to prepare for a political settlement. AU chairman,
Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, convened talks in Abuja, Nigeria, but
observers believe progress will be slow without international pressure on
Khartoum to compromise.
Tardy United Nations Security Council Intervention
On July 30th the U.N. Security Council finally passed its
first resolution in response to the Darfur atrocities (Res. 1556). The
resolution was notable for what it failed to do.
•• It placed no arms embargo on the Sudan government.
•• It called on Khartoum to disarm the militia, apprehend
and bring to justice the Janjawiid leaders who carried out the violence,
stop attacks on civilians and remove restrictions on humanitarian relief.
•• It imposed a 30-day deadline for implementation, but
provided for no penalties, such as sanctions, in the absence of progress.
Even the 30-day deadline proved sadly flexible.
On September 18th, U.S. efforts led to the passage of a
second Security Council resolution, which did not penalize Sudan for failure
to carry through on disarming the Janjawiid, or bringing perpetrators of
violence to justice. The resolution did not name the Sudan government as
responsible for the atrocities in Darfur, and again failed to impose any
immediate oil, arms or other effective sanctions on Khartoum. China, which
has signifi- cant oil interests in Sudan, threatened a veto and abstained
after achieving removal of sanctions language.
Some small forward steps were registered in the provision
for the rapid establishment of an international commission of enquiry to
establish accountability for human rights violations that have taken place,
and "to determine also whether acts of genocide have occurred." Potentially
even more significant, the resolution approved the deployment of an expanded
African Union monitoring force, and "encourages the undertaking of proactive
monitoring."
Without strong international logistical and financial
support this force cannot provide an adequate presence for the protection of
civilians. The lack of sanctions means that the income from oil production
will help finance Sudan government violence. It can easily buy arms.
URGENT TASKS
Challenge starvation, thirst, and disease.
The crisis has forced the U.N. to keep revising upwards
the funds needed to establish and maintain survival camps able to provide
adequate food, clean water, sanitation and health facilities for the flood
of people driven off their land. In mid-September U.N. Secretary- General
Kofi Annan told member states that the U.N. was still short by $250 million
of the $722 million it needed for immediate relief.
The United Nations has not mustered the political will to
stop the killing, but its many humanitarian agencies are playing an
important role in delivering survival food, water, shelter, basic health and
maternal care to people in need. William Garvelink, Senior Deputy Assistant
Administrator USAID, told a press conference on October 4 that the U.S. had
pledged $299 million for Darfur assistance in 2004 and 2005, and $257
million had already gone, $187 million to U.N. agencies. (See http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200410080958.
html) It remains for concerned activists in the U.S. to ensure that the U.S.
expands its contribution, also using its leverage to encourage support from
other members of the international community. Leaders in Congress need to
hear this message early and often.
End impunity and impose sanctions.
Until the Sudan government reaps pain, rather than profit,
from its policies of violence and dispossession, it will have no incentive
to end the killing, begin serious negotiations and lay the groundwork for
peace. Calls on Khartoum to diminish insecurity and the threat to civilians
and demands that the militia be disarmed must carry with them a real price
for failure to comply. Targeted sanctions can play an important role in
pressuring Khartoum to abandon its gallop through the killing fields. In
September Rep. Thomas Tancredo introduced the "Comprehensive Peace in Sudan
Act" (HR 5061). It mandated U.S. sanctions, including a prohibition on any
entity which does business in Sudan being able to raise capital or sell its
securities in the U.S. and imposes bans on the issuing of visas to senior
Khartoum government and military until Sudan takes a comprehensive set of
actions to end the violence and build peace. It also mandated the provision
of significant aid to Sudan, provided the regime complies with the
conditions for peace set out.
Sadly, strong economic sanctions did not survive passage
of HR 5061 by the House of Representatives on October 7, and the unanimous
September Senate action (S 2781) was marred by similar weakness.
There is work to be done: the drive to impose effective
sanctions can provide focus in the months ahead, enabling activists to exert
pressure on the administration, the international community and Khartoum.
Support the African Union peacekeeping force.
Following the September U.N. Security Council Resolution
that approved the deployment of an expanded African Union monitoring force,
and encouraged the undertaking of proactive monitoring, the AU Chairman,
Nigerian President Obasanjo, told the Security Council that the African
Union was gearing up to provide a 3,000-5,000 strong force from five African
nations This force would operate under an expanded mandate, so that it would
be able to provide urgently needed protection for civilians by patrolling,
entering IDP camps and effectively serving as a peacekeeping force. Obasanjo
asked that international donors make this immediately possible by providing
$200 million or making available transport and other logistical assistance.
So far the U.S. has provided some $20 million for previous
African Union-Sudan operations. The support will have to be multiplied
significantly to provide the AU with the capability to help end the killing
and create a climate of peace.
-Written by Jennifer Davis, Washington Office on Africa
Footnotes:
1. On The Record Briefing, 9/29/04, U.S.
AID Administrator Andrew Natsios and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs Michael Rannenberger, Washington D.C. Natsios said
at this briefing that 574 villages had been completely destroyed, detection
being provided by aerial surveys. (See
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/36615pf.html)
2.WHO Press Releases. Health Situation in
Darfur Sudan, 9/13/04. (See
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2004/pr63/en/)
3. The Washington Post, Page A27,
Thursday, 9/9/04
4. Sudan: Peace on the Threshold?
Stewardship of Public Life, Africa: 4th Quarter 2003; p.2
5. H.Con.Res. 467 House of
Representatives July 22, 2004
General Assembly:
The 206th General Assembly urged its members, congregations, leaders, and
governing bodies to be strong advocates for peace with justice in Sudan,
pressing U.S. elected officials to give focused attention to the crisis in
Sudan and to exert U.S. government influence within the international
community of nations including the United Nations, the Organization of
Africa Unity, the Arab League, and any multilateral initiatives that offer
hope for progress. (Minutes, 1994, p. 570)
Published by the Stewardship of Public Life (SPL)
advocacy program of the Washington Office, Presbyterian Church (USA), 110
Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 543-1126,
www.pcusa.org/washington
